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We show how to use decoherence-free subspaces over collective-noise quantum channels to convey
classical information in perfect secrecy. We argue that codes defined over decoherence-free subspaces
are codes for quantum wiretap channels in which the gain of information by a non-authorized receiver
is zero. We also show that if some symmetry conditions are guaranteed, the maximum rate on which
these secret communications take place is equal to the Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland capacity
of the quantum channel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Preventing errors in quantum information is one of the
main objectives of Quantum Information Theory. Errors
can arise from the coupling of the system of interest to the
environment, and the subsequent decoherence induced by
this coupling. Because of the fragile nature of quantum
states, decoherence is considered as the main obstacle in
the transmission of coherent information [1].
In the context of Quantum Communications,
decoherence is responsible for the information leak-
age out to the environment in a noisy quantum channel.
If secret messages are conveyed through it, at least part
of them can be gathered by a non-authorized receiver
called wiretapper. This situation is undesired in a
cryptographic scenario and must be avoided.
Cai et. al [2] and Devetak [3] modeled this scenario
in the so called quantum wiretap channels. They also
established the conditions to perform classical informa-
tion exchange without being deceived by a wiretapper.
In their formulation, only codes that minimize the error
decoding probability and that maximize the equivoca-
tion of the wiretapper are adequate. But the maximum
rate in which the secret communication takes place, the
quantum secrecy capacity, is usually below the ordinary
capacity of the channel to convey classical information.
For overcoming decoherence, some good methods
have been proposed such as quantum error-correcting
codes, dynamical decoupling, decoherence-free subspaces
(DFS), and so on [4]. Regarding DFS, in particular,
if the error operators that affect the qubits have some
symmetries, then the qubits will suffer from the same
noise in quantum channel and that will compensate the
effects, keeping the invariability of these states, i.e., no
decoherence takes place in such subspaces [5]. Therefore,
these subspaces seem to be suitable to construct codes
that minimize the information leakage out to the envi-
ronment.
So far, some works in the literature already explore the
potential of DFS in Quantum Communications. All of
them consist of protocols against certain types of collec-
tive noise (such as rotation, dephasing, amplitude damp-
ing, among others) and consider the use of small DFS
(with two or three qubits, for instance) [6–10]. Even ex-
perimental realization were already implemented aiming
at quantum information processing [11–14]. In the per-
spective of these works, the protection of information
means avoiding the loss of coherence, maintaining the
fidelity of the quantum states.
In this paper, we investigate more general conse-
quences of using DFS in Quantum Communications from
the perspective of secure message exchange. We state a
formal definition of quantum channels which satisfy the
DFS symmetry criteria, define codes over their subspaces,
and also establish the conditions to perform secret com-
munications in this scenario. We conclude that any code
defined with such characteristics is also a code suitable for
quantum wiretap channels. Moreover, the secrecy capa-
city in such subspaces is equal to the Holevo-Schumacher-
Westmoreland (HSW) capacity in these quantum chan-
nels. This is a particular case in which the secrecy capa-
city is maximal.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The con-
ditions for quantum privacy, established by Schumacher
and Westmoreland [15], as well as the concepts regarding
quantum wiretap channels are recalled in Section II. The
fundamentals on DFS are introduced in Section III. Our
contributions are stated in Section IV. A detailed exam-
ple illustrating the results obtained is shown in Section
V. Lastly, final remarks are presented in Section VI.
II. QUANTUM PRIVACY AND QUANTUM
WIRETAP CHANNELS
Suppose that a sender (Alice) prepares a quantum sys-
tem B in an initial state ρ. Her objective is to send this
system to a specific receiver (Bob) through a noisy quan-
tum channel, denoted by the superoperator EB . This
way, the state of the system received by Bob is denoted
by ρBob = EB(ρ).
Due to the presence of the noise, to provide a unitary
description of the evolution of ρBob along the channel it
is necessary to consider the interaction with the environ-
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2ment which is initially defined to be in a pure state |0E〉.
In this case, the superoperator is given by
EB(ρ) = TrE UBE (ρ⊗ |0E〉 〈0E|)UBE† (1)
where UBE stands for a unitary interaction operation.
Suppose that Alice is using this quantum channel to
send classical information to Bob. Alice then prepares
the quantum system B into one of the possible states
ρk with a priori probabilities pk. To decode the mes-
sage received, Bob performs measurements using some
decoding observable. The amount of classical information
conveyed from Alice to Bob, which we will denote HBob,
is governed by the Holevo quantity χBob, defined as
χBob = S(ρBob)−
∑
k
pkS (ρBob,k) (2)
Some considerations about the Holevo quantity in this
scenario must be mentioned: (i) HBob ≤ χBob regardless
of the decoding observable chosen; and (ii) HBob can be
made arbitrarily close to χBob through a suitable choice
of a code and decoding observable. In this case, χBob
represents an upper bound on the classical information
conveyed from Alice to Bob.
When considering the cryptographic purposes of the
channel, then the eavesdropper (Eve) must have access to
some or all of the environment E with which B interacts.
The evolution superoperator EB describes all effects of
the eavesdropper on the channel or, in other words, all
of the efforts to wiretap the channel between Alice and
Bob are contained in the interaction operator UBE . This
way, the information available to Eve, denoted by HEve,
will be limited by:
χEve = S(ρEve)−
∑
k
pkS(ρEve,k) (3)
The inequality HEve ≤ χEve holds whether Eve has ac-
cess or not to the entire environment.
The quantum privacy is defined as
P = HBob −HEve (4)
Alice and Bob wish to make P as large as possible. But,
they must assume that the eavesdropper is acquiring
her greatest possible information from the channel. The
guaranteed privacy, PG = inf P , is the infimum over all
possible strategies adopted by Eve. Since HEve ≤ χEve,
then PG ≥ HBob − χEve. On the other hand, Alice and
Bob will want to use the channel to make the guaranteed
privacy PG as great as possible. Let P = supPG. The
best scheme they use aims to make HBob close to χ
Bob.
This way, we denote P as
P = χBob − χEve (5)
Despite the characterization of the quantum privacy,
it is necessary to characterize schemes that describe how
Alice and Bob should proceed to establish the channel
properties to perform secure communications without
being deceived by a wiretapper. To do so, Cai et al. [2]
and Devetak [3] simultaneously characterized the quan-
tum wiretap channels, defined as follows.
Definition 1. A quantum memoryless wiretap channel
is described by a pair of superoperators EB and EE from
a complex Hilbert space H. When Alice sends a quan-
tum state ω from H⊗n, Bob receives E⊗n,B(ω) and Eve
receives E⊗n,E(ω), where n is the dimension of the input
Hilbert space.
The codes used by the legitimate participants of the
communication are characterized in Definition 2.
Definition 2. A set of codewords of length n (n =
dim(H)) for a set U of classical messages is a set of input
states labeled by messages in U , Ω(U) = {ω(u) : u ∈ U},
and a decoding measurement of length n for the set U of
messages is a measurement on a length-n output space
of the channel with outcome in U , i.e., a set of posi-
tive operators Du, u ∈ U with
∑
u∈U Du ≤ 1. The pair
(Ω(U), {Du : u ∈ U}) is called a code of length n for the
set U of messages. The rate of this code is 1n log |U|.
The Figure 1 synthesizes the quantum wiretap chan-
nel general idea. Alice creates a quantum state ω(u)
when she wants to send the message u ∈ U to
Bob. Due to the noise, Bob receives E⊗n,B(ω(u)) =
TrE [E⊗n(ρ⊗ |0E〉 〈0E |)] and decodes it using a positive
operator-value measurement (POVM) {Du : u ∈ U}, that
results in an estimate u′ for u. Eve, in turn, receives the
state E⊗n,E(ω(u)) = TrB [E⊗n(ρ⊗ |0E〉 〈0E |)] and will
try to obtain as much information as possible from the
message sent by Alice. To do so, she will try to build a
POVM based on the typicality of the states measured by
her following a strategy presented in [2, Sec. 4].
FIG. 1. General idea of the quantum wiretap channel.
However, despite the strategy of communication has
been depicted, the arguments of security regarding the
message exchanged have not been defined yet. It is
necessary to ensure a small decoding error probability
between the legitimate participants of the communica-
tion while the wiretapper learns almost nothing of the
secret message. The formalization of these two require-
ments is presented in Definition 3.
3Definition 3. (Wiretap Code) A code
(Ω(U), {Du : u ∈ U}) of length n is called a wiretap
code with parameters (n, |U| , λ, µ) if, for λ, µ > 0:
Pe = 1− 1|U|
∑
u∈U
TrE
[E⊗n,B(ω(u))Du] ≤ λ (6)
and
1
n
S
∑
u∈U
1
|U| E
⊗n,E(ω(u))
−∑
u∈U
1
|U|S
(
E⊗n,E(ω(u))
) < µ
(7)
where 1n log |U| is called the code rate.
In this definition, Eq. (6) guarantees that the decoding
error probability for Bob is, on average, smaller than λ;
and Eq. (7) bounds the average accessible information
in such a way that the wiretapper can obtain (almost)
nothing about the message sent by Alice.
Lastly, the quantum secrecy capacity is defined as:
Definition 4. ( Quantum Secrecy Capacity [2]) The se-
crecy capacity of a quantum channel is the maximum real
number CS such that for all , λ, µ > 0 and sufficiently
large n there exists a (n, |U| , λ, µ) code with:
CS <
1
n
log |U|+  (8)
Despite the previous definitions assume messages uni-
formly distributed, the following theorem about the se-
crecy capacity due to [2, Sec. 5] is a more general result.
Theorem 1. For a quantum wiretap channel E as
characterized in the Definition 1, the quantum secrecy
capacity satisfies:
CS(E) ≥ max{P}
[
χBob − χEve] (9)
where the maximum is taken over all probability distri-
butions P over U ; and χBob and χEve are the Holevo
quantities given in Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively.
The quantum secrecy capacity can be understood as
the maximum rate in which is possible to convey clas-
sical information in perfect secrecy through a quantum
channel. It is equivalent to the supreme of the guaran-
teed quantum privacy defined in Eq. (5). A particular
characteristic of the quantum secrecy capacity is that it
does not have a single-letter characterization, i.e., it is
not computable since it considers all the input states and
also all probability distributions over them [2, 3].
III. DECOHERENCE-FREE SUBSPACES
Due to decoherence, a quantum system begins to lose
energy into the environment and decay to a ground state,
its relative phase is erased and, thus, the information it
carries is lost [16]. In this section, we will show how
to avoid these undesired effects despite the existence of
decoherence.
Let a closed quantum system be composed by the sys-
tem of interest S defined on a Hilbert space H and by
the environment E. The Hamiltonian that describes this
system is defined as follows:
H = HS ⊗ 1E + 1S ⊗HE +HSE (10)
where 1 is the identity operator; and HS , HE and HSE
denote the Hamiltonians of system, environment and
system-environment interaction, respectively.
In order to prevent errors, it would be ideal that HSE
were equal to zero, indicating that system and environ-
ment are decoupled and evolve independently and unita-
rily under their respective Hamiltonians HS and HE [5].
However, in practical scenarios, such an ideal situation
is not possible since no system is noiseless. So, after iso-
lating a system to the best of our ability, we should aim
for the realistic goals of the identification and correction
of errors when they occur and/or avoiding noises when
possible and/or suppressing noise in the system [4].
If some symmetries exist in the interaction between
the system and the environment, it is possible to find
a “quiet corner” in the system Hilbert space not expe-
riencing decoherence. Let {Ai(t)} be a set of operators
in the operator-sum representation (OSR) corresponding
to the evolution of the system. We say that a system
density matrix ρS is invariant under the OSR operators
{Ai(t)} if
∑
iAi(t)ρSA
†
i (t) = ρS . We are now able to
define the DFS whose states are invariant despite a non-
trivial coupling between the system and the environment.
Definition 5. A subspace H˜ of a Hilbert space H is called
a DFS with respect to a system-environment coupling if
every pure state from this subspace is invariant under
the corresponding OSR evolution for any possible envi-
ronment initial condition:
∑
i
Ai(t)|k˜〉〈k˜|A†i (t) = |k˜〉〈k˜|,∀|k˜〉〈k˜| ∈ H˜,∀ρE(0) (11)
Let the Hamiltonian of the system-environment inte-
raction be HSE =
∑
j Sj ⊗ Ej , where Sj and Ej are
the system and environment operators, respectively. We
consider that the environment operators Ej are linearly
independent. The symmetries required to define a DFS
are described in the theorem below. For a detailed proof
or different formulations see [5, Sec. 5].
Theorem 2. (DFS Conditions) A subspace H˜ is a DFS
iff the system operators Sj act proportional to the iden-
tity on the subspace:
Sj |k˜〉 = cj |k˜〉 ∀j, |k˜〉 ∈ H˜ (12)
4In practice, identifying a useful symmetry and taking
advantage of it can be very difficult. One must (i) iden-
tify the symmetry, (ii) find the states which are invariant
to the interaction, and (iii) construct, if possible, oper-
ations on the system which will serve as a universal set
of gating operations while preserving the necessary sym-
metries [4].
Quantum codes constructed from states of a DFS
are classified as quantum error-avoiding codes (QEAC)
and the tasks of perturbation and recovery on them are
trivial. They can be contrasted with quantum-error cor-
recting codes (QECC) in some aspects. While QECCs are
devised to correct errors after their occurrence, QEACs
do not have the ability to correct errors since they avoid
them; QECCs devised in practical circumstances belong
to the class of non-degenerate codes while QEACs are
highly degenerate; QEACs usually require a lower num-
ber of physical qubits to encode one logical qubit than
QECCs. In particular, if the degeneracy attains the max-
imum, a QECC reduces to a QEAC what illustrates a
circumstance in which a type of code becomes equivalent
to the other [17].
The absence of decoherence in DFS has been shown
as of major importance for implementations of quantum
memory and quantum algorithms. Other applications of
it cover encoding information in quantum dots, collective
dissipation, noise reduction, among others [4, 5].
IV. DFS IN SECURE QUANTUM
COMMUNICATIONS
We will now examine the use of DFS in Quantum Com-
munications. We will consider the use of collective noise
quantum channels, i.e., a model of quantum channels in
which several qubits couple identically to the same en-
vironment, while undergoing both dephasing and dissi-
pation [18]. This particular case gives a light into some
interesting consequences of the use of DFS in quantum
communications. Our focus, in particular, will be in the
aspects of secure message exchange.
We consider the case that Alice wants to convey se-
cret classical messages through a quantum channel to
Bob. These messages must be protected from a wiretap-
per Eve that has full access to the environment. The
channel between Alice and Bob has a decoherence-free
subspace whose states will be used to encode the se-
cret message. The following definition characterizes such
quantum channel.
Definition 6. (Collective Noise Quantum Wiretap
Channel) A collective noise quantum wiretap channel
E is a channel as in Definition 1 such that its Kraus
decomposition {Ai} satisfies Theorem 2.
Since {Ai} satisfies Theorem 2, then the channel E has
a decoherence-free subspace H˜. When Alice wants to
send a message to a Bob, now she can make it using a
QEAC with the following definition.
Definition 7. Let H˜ be a DFS spanned by a set of
eigenvectors {|k˜〉}, i.e., H˜ = Span[{|k˜〉}]. A set of code-
words of length n (n = dim(H˜)) for a set U of clas-
sical messages is a set of input states labeled by mes-
sages in U , K˜(U) = {k˜(u) : u ∈ U} ⊆ H˜, and a
trivial decoding measurement composed of a set of pos-
itive operators D˜u, u ∈ U with
∑
u∈U D˜u ≤ 1. The pair
(K˜(U), {D˜u : u ∈ U}) is called a QEAC of length n for
the set U of messages. The rate of this code is 1n log |U|.
Without loss of generality, we will consider here that
the environment starts in a pure state |0E〉 〈0E|. This
is a clear assumption since we can always imagine that
a “local” environment in a mixed state is just part of a
larger system in a pure entangled state [15].
Using the code defined, if Alice wants to send a quan-
tum message u now she encodes it the QEAC defined
over H˜, obtaining k˜(u). When she sends it through the
communication channel, the message interacts with the
environment. Bob then receives ρBob(k˜(u)) and Eve re-
ceives ρEve(k˜(u)) which are given by:
ρBob(k˜(u)) = TrE
[
E⊗n(k˜(u)⊗ |0E〉 〈0E |)
]
(13)
ρEve(k˜(u)) = TrB
[
E⊗n(k˜(u)⊗ |0E〉 〈0E |)
]
(14)
Since Alice used a QEAC, then the existing dynamical
symmetry protected the quantum information from the
interaction with the environment. It means that the joint
evolution of the system and the environment occurred in
a decoupled way. Hence, the state ρBob(k˜(u)) is given
by:
ρBob(k˜(u)) = TrE
[
E⊗n(k˜(u)⊗ |0E〉 〈0E |)
]
(15)
= TrE
[∑
i
Ai
(
k˜(u)⊗ |0E〉 〈0E |
)
A†i
]
(16)
= TrE
[
k˜(u)⊗ ρE
]
(17)
= k˜(u) (18)
where Eq. (17) is due to the invariance of a state of the
DFS under the OSR operators. Taking into account the
Hamiltonian of the quantum system given in Eq. (10)
and the fact that the system of interest and the environ-
ment did not interact, it is the case that the environment
would only suffer from the action of HE , indicating a uni-
tary evolution restricted to the environment.
We will now show how such QEAC protects the infor-
mation conveyed through the channel from a wiretapper.
Lemma 1. A QEAC as in Definition 7 over a collective
noise quantum wiretap channel as in Definition 6 is a
wiretap code with parameters (n, |U| , λ, µ).
Proof. The proof is straightforward. We have to prove
that the QEAC satisfies the criteria of Eqs. (6) and (7).
5Let’s first analyze the average decoding error proba-
bility. Since k˜(u) is in H˜, it did not interact with the
environment. So, ρBob = k˜(u) as shown in Eqs. (15)-
(18). It turns out that the decoding is trivial and that
the message sent by Alice can be perfectly recovered since
there is a decoding measurement D˜u for every u ∈ U . We
can see, thus, that there is a negligible average decoding
error probability for Bob.
Then we proceed to analyze Eq. (7). Recall that it
is the average accessible information by Eve which is
bounded by the Holevo quantity, defined in Eq. (3). We
will try to obtain the Holevo quantity first.
Despite the state of the environment ρE (vide Eq.
(17)) is not known, the fact that Alice and Bob used
states from a DFS guaranteed that the interaction Hamil-
tonian HSE did not govern the joint evolution of system
and environment. Instead of that, each system evolved
completely unitary under its own Hamiltonian, i.e., the
environment suffered only the action of HE . It implies
that the environment ended in a pure state. Using this
result to calculate the Holevo quantity, we have:
χEve = S(ρEve(k˜(u)))−
∑
k
pkS(ρEve,kk˜(u)) (19)
= S(ρE)−
∑
k
pkS(ρEve,kk˜(u)) (20)
= 0−
∑
k
pkS(ρEve,kk˜(u)) (21)
It is well known that the Holevo quantity χEve ≥ 0. Since
S(ρ) ≥ 0 for any ρ, and that the probabilities pk ≥ 0 for
any k, then it is the case that the remaining term is zero.
Thus, χEve = 0. Since the Holevo quantity is an upper
bound of the accessible information, then Eq. (7) is also
equal to zero. It concludes the proof.
We can now characterize the secrecy capacity of a
collective noise quantum wiretap channel.
Theorem 3. The secrecy capacity of a collective noise
quantum wiretap channel E , characterized as in Defini-
tion 6, satisfies
CS,DFS(E) = max{P}
[
χBob
]
(22)
where the maximum is taken over all probability distri-
butions P over U ; and χBob is the Holevo quantity given
in Eq. (2).
Proof. Let a QEAC (K˜(U), {D˜u : u ∈ U}) be used over
the channel E . As proved in Lemma 1, it was shown
that χEve = 0. Firstly, this fact is substituted into
Eq. (9). The equality is due to the Holevo-Schumacher-
Westmoreland theorem [19].
We can therefore conclude that it is possible to per-
form unconditionally secure quantum communications
through wiretapped collective noise quantum channels.
The unconditional security criterion is satisfied since
χEve = 0, meaning that no information was gathered
by Eve and that the communication was carried out in
perfect secrecy.
The resulting expression of the secrecy capacity of a
DFS has a relation to the results presented by Schu-
macher and Westmoreland [15]. These authors show that
the ability of the quantum channel to send private infor-
mation is at least as great as its ability to send coherent
information. Since the information encoded in a DFS
does not loose coherence, then its ability to send private
information is maximal.
V. EXAMPLE – COLLECTIVE DEPHASING
To illustrate the results described in the previous sec-
tion, we will show a detailed example of conveying secret
classical messages through a collective dephasing quan-
tum channel E . Let’s suppose that qubits on this channel
couple to the environment in a symmetric manner and
undergo a dephasing process, defined as:
|0〉 → |0〉 |1〉 → eıφ |1〉 (23)
To overcome decoherence, Alice and Bob can take ad-
vantage from an existing symmetry in the channel. If
they codify the messages using states that are immune
to decoherence, Eve can learn nothing from their secret
messages. To do so, Alice and Bob will use the following
codification scheme
|0L〉 = |01〉 |1L〉 = |10〉 (24)
A qubit can, thus, be codified as |ψL〉 = α |0L〉+ β |1L〉.
It is interesting to see that |ψL〉 does not suffer from the
effects of decoherence
E(|ψL〉) = E (α |0L〉+ β |1L〉) (25)
= αeıφ |01〉+ βeıφ |10〉 (26)
= eıφ (α |01〉+ β |10〉) (27)
= eıφ |ψL〉 (28)
= |ψL〉 (29)
because the overall phase factor eıφ acquired due to the
dephasing process has no physical significance.
In this example, the messages sent by Alice are bi-
nary, so U = {0, 1}. She will encode the bits in the
following way: k˜(0) = |01〉 and k˜(1) = |10〉. So,
K˜(U) = {|01〉 , |10〉}. Making use of this code to send
the message u, Alice encodes in the corresponding k˜(u)
which she conveys through the channel. We assume that
the bits 0 and 1 are equally likely and that the environ-
ment starts in a pure state.
6To decode the states received Bob will use the following
POVM: D˜0 = |01〉 〈01| and D˜1 = |10〉 〈10|. His Holevo
quantity in this scenario will be equal to
χBob = S
(
ρBobk˜(u)
)
−
∑
u
puS (ρBob,u) (30)
= S
(
1
2
|01〉 〈01|+ 1
2
|10〉 〈10|
)
−
∑
u={0,1}
1
2
S
(
k˜(u)
)
(31)
= 1− 0− 0 = 1 (32)
We can conclude that the secrecy capacity for this scena-
rio is equal to CS,DFS(E) = 1 bit per channel use. This
is an example of how to convey secret messages using a
DFS through a noisy quantum channel with a positive
rate using a very simple encoding-decoding scheme.
VI. FINAL REMARKS
From our analysis, we can conclude that if a quan-
tum channel is characterized as in Definition 6, then the
existence of certain symmetries in this channel can be ex-
ploited to send classical information with unconditional
security. The encoding using a QEAC can be seen as an
instance of a wiretap code with the particularity that no
information is gathered by the wiretapper.
The secrecy capacity of such channels shown in Eq.
(22) is equal to the HSW capacity of a quantum channel
[19]. This is a particular case in which the ability of
a quantum channel to send secret information can be
made as large as its capacity to send ordinary classical
information.
Regarding the secrecy capacity, Cai et. al [2] argue
that obtaining a computable secrecy capacity is most
likely to be even more difficult than obtaining a com-
putable form of the capacity of a quantum channel for the
classical information. In our particular case for collective-
noise quantum wiretap channels, secrecy capacity equals
the HSW capacity, what turns out to be less difficult to
compute.
Due to the technical difficulties to build completely
closed quantum system [8], the results shown here
can be applied to build devices that perform uncondi-
tional secure message exchange even in the presence of
decoherence. It is very promising in practical applica-
tions especially considering already existing results re-
garding the use of DFS in communications [20–22], par-
ticularly in long-distance [23].
We emphasize that the results presented here cannot
be generalized to all quantum channels since the condi-
tions for a DFS are not satisfied by all of them. Zanardi
and Rasetti [18] argue that the DFS conditions only arise
in scenarios where collective decoherence takes place. Be-
sides that, the advantages verified in terms of secrecy and
rate to this particular case are significant.
In future work, we suggest the investigation of the im-
pacts of the results shown in the simplification of certain
communication protocols that make use of DFS [6, 9, 10].
We also suggest the investigation of more general con-
ditions to the existence of perfect secrecy in quantum
systems.
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